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Abstract We explored the relationship between epistemo-
logical beliefs and nature of science in a college biology
course. One hundred thirty-three college students partici-
pated in the research. Exploratory factor analysis with 29
Nature of Science (NOS) items yielded three aspects of
NOS: empirical, tentative, and sociocultural nature of
scientific knowledge. Pearson r correlations suggested that
students who have immature epistemological beliefs are
more likely to also have immature beliefs of nature of
science. In addition, students’ epistemological beliefs
significantly correlate with their conceptual change but
their beliefs about nature of science did not. The research is
significant in that it provides empirical evidence explaining
the relationship between students’ epistemological beliefs
and nature of science as well as the relationships between
epistemological beliefs and conceptual change in evolution
theory.
Keywords Epistemological beliefs . Nature of science .
Conceptual change . Evolutionary theory . College students
Introduction
Students often enter college biology courses with
strongly held scientific misconceptions that interfere with
their ability to understand accurate explanations. There-
fore, one of the major goals in biology education is to
help students engage in conceptual change; however,
student conceptual change is difficult to accomplish,
especially when students are learning about evolutionary
theory (Bishop and Anderson 1990; Rutledge and Warden
2000). One of the common ways of teaching evolution
theory is to discuss Darwin’s voyage and the evidence he
observed as integral to building the concept of evolution
theory; however, often even well-designed lessons are not
sufficient to help students undergo conceptual change. As
a result, students often complete biology courses holding
the same misconceptions they had prior to taking the
course, even after numerous biology courses (Bishop and
Anderson 1990).
Recently, researchers have begun to examine role of
individuals’ affective characteristics such as epistemologi-
cal beliefs on ability of students to undergo conceptual
change (Sahin 2010; Stathopoulou and Vosniadou 2007).
Sahin (2010) discovered that the ability of students to
understand physics concepts was significantly related to
their beliefs about physics and physics learning. Likewise,
Stathopoulou and Vosniadou (2007) found students’
epistemological beliefs about physics was a strong predictor
of their understanding of physics, and that commonly
students’ epistemological beliefs are related to conceptual
understanding about science; however, few studies have
been conducted in biology to investigate the relationships
between epistemological beliefs and conceptual change.
Because students’ epistemological beliefs are domain
specific, more research is necessary to understand the role
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of epistemological beliefs in biology—in particular, evolu-
tion theory.
Research on epistemological beliefs started from Perry’s
research (1970) and has continuously expanded its interests
into diverse areas including learning strategies, motivation,
and conceptual change. Despite of decades of research
efforts, there is still lack of agreement among educators of
different disciplines (e.g., educational psychologists and
science researchers) when it comes to defining epistemo-
logical beliefs. Educational psychologists define epistemo-
logical beliefs as personal beliefs about knowledge and
knowing (Hofer and Pintrich 1997; Shommer-Aikins 2004).
Science educators, on the other hand, describe epistemo-
logical beliefs as the Nature of Science (NOS), which are
context-specific beliefs about knowledge and knowing of
science. The lack of interaction between the two disciplines
may cause confusion to researchers or educators who are
interested in the relationships between epistemological
beliefs and conceptual change in science, and no research
has been conducted to investigate the relationship between
epistemological beliefs and conceptual change by using
both disciplinary perspectives. Therefore, in this study, we
explored for the first time the relationships among
epistemological beliefs, nature of science, and conceptual
change.
Epistemological Beliefs from Educational Psychologists’
Perspective
Research on epistemological beliefs was initiated by Perry
(1970). He found that students do have strong beliefs about
knowing and knowledge but they can change over time.
Perry (1970) argued that students entering college perceive
knowledge to be simple, certain, and provided by the
instructor; however, upon graduation, the same students
often hold more sophisticated beliefs, viewing knowledge
as complex, tentative, and derived from reason and
observation.
Since Perry’s research, perhaps one of the most influ-
ential studies in epistemological beliefs was conducted by
Schommer (1990). Schommer suggested that students’
epistemological beliefs consist of a collection of more or
less orthogonal beliefs. She made the case that students’
epistemological beliefs have diverse dimensions that are in
a continuum from less to more sophisticated, and that the
beliefs are developed from novice to sophisticated level.
Schommer suggested five theoretical dimensions of episte-
mological beliefs: (1) the structure of knowledge (from
simple to complex nature of knowledge), (2) the stability of
knowledge (from factual to constantly changing nature of
knowledge), (3) the source of knowledge (from omniscient
source to empirically evidenced-based nature of knowl-
edge), (4) the speed of learning (from quick to gradual
nature of learning), and (5) the ability to learn (from fixed
or innate to incremental nature of ability). Using explor-
atory factor analyses, Schommer found support for these
dimensions of epistemological belief, with the exception of
the source of knowledge (3). Although there are still
ongoing debates about the dimensions of epistemological
beliefs (Hofer and Pintrich 1997), Schommer’s dimensions
are commonly accepted among educational psychologists.
In an attempt to more fully understand the dimensions of
epistemological beliefs, Bendixen et al. (1998) extracted
items from the research of Schommer and generated new
items. They found five dimensions of epistemological
beliefs that they identified as (1) certain knowledge, (2)
simple knowledge, (3) omniscient authority, (4) quick
learning, and (5) innate ability. Certain knowledge beliefs
are held by students that view knowledge as certain or
absolute rather than tentative. Students who have simple
knowledge beliefs view knowledge as simple rather than
contextual and contingent. Omniscient authority depicts
knowledge as coming from “out of self,” such as from
textbook or teachers, rather than coming from interactions
with others. Quick learning explains whether students view
learning as occurring quickly rather than gradually, and
innate ability describes intelligence or learning ability as
innate and therefore effort does not make any difference.
Nature of Science from Science Researchers’ Perspective
Nature of science is the common name used by science
researchers to describe epistemological beliefs in science
contexts. NOS addresses multiple issues related to the
philosophical assumptions of science (Smith and Wenk
2006), including: values, development, conceptual inven-
tions, development of consensus within the scientific
community, and unique characteristics of scientific
knowledge (Lederman 1992; Tsai 2007).
Perhaps the definition of NOS developed by Lederman
(1992) is most widely used. Lederman (1992) defined the
phrase “Nature of Science” as a way of knowing or the
values and beliefs that are inherent to the development of
scientific knowledge; however, there is a lack of consensus
among philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science
on what actually constitutes NOS (Abd-El-Khalick 2005;
Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman 2000; Alters 1997; Clough
and Olson 2008; Osborne et al. 2003). Osborne et al. (2003)
cite research findings by Alters (1997) to provide an
empirical basis for the lack of consensus about NOS. Alters
(1997) surveyed 217 members of the U.S. Philosophy of
Science Association, and his interpretation of the 187
responses indicated no single account of NOS existed among
study participants. Science educators often reference NOS as
a means of explaining what science is, how it works,
and how scientists function (Clough and Olson 2008).
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Abd-El-Khalick (2005) reports science educators often have
different conceptions of NOS and what should be presented
to students.
There appears to be a level of generality, although not
complete agreement, regarding certain aspects of NOS
(AAAS 1993; Abd-El-Khalick 1998, 2005; NRC 1996;
Smith et al. 1997). The general aspects of NOS are
described as four aspects of science. These general aspects
of NOS include perceptions of scientific knowledge as: (a)
tentative and, as such, subject to change; (b) supported by,
based upon, or derived from empirical evidence resulting
from observations of the natural world; (c) described as
theory-laden with explanations derived in part from human
inference, imagination, and creativity; (d) influenced by
social and cultural aspects of society (AAAS 1993; Abd-El-
Khalick 1998, 2005; Lederman 1992; NRC 1996; Smith et
al. 1997). Each of these four dimensions warrants further
discussions.
Empirical Nature of Science The empirical nature of
science refers to the manner in which new scientific
knowledge is generated, validated, and accepted by the
scientific community. Science is described as a way of
knowing that demands evidence for validation and
acceptance among members of the scientific community
(AAAS 1993; Lederman 1992). Abd-El-Khalick (2005)
posits scientific knowledge is generated through “critical,
negotiated, and collaborative inquiries that are propelled by
scientists’ imaginations and bound only by their observa-
tions of the natural world” (p. 17). Hence, scientific
knowledge is usually characterized as knowledge derived
from or based upon observations of the natural world; as a
result, science demands that claims are backed with
evidence that can be confirmed through scientific inquiry
and supported with logical argument (AAAS 1993; Abd-El-
Khalick and Lederman 2000). Evidence to support scien-
tific knowledge is filtered through scientists’ perception of
their observations and also through intricate instrumenta-
tion with data analysis and interpretation guided by
elaborate theoretical frameworks. Therefore, science is
unique compared to other ways of knowing because
scientific knowledge is based upon empirical evidence
filtered by human interpretation (Lederman 1992).
Scientific Theories and Laws Because science is a human
endeavor, it is ultimately dependent upon individual or
group interpretation and, therefore, described as theory-
laden (Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman 2000). Making
sense of observations of phenomena is accomplished
through the development of explanations that are consis-
tent with existing scientific knowledge and principles;
such explanations are referenced as theories (AAAS
1993). Theories are overarching explanations of the
natural world. Theories are typically inferred and explain
the relationship between observations of multiple phe-
nomena, most of which are not directly observable or
testable (Lederman et al. 2002). An example would be the
kinetic molecular theory. This theory explains that all
matter is composed of small particles and describes the
relationship between those particles within the context of
solids, liquids, and gases. This theory can also explain
rates of diffusion, chemical reactions as well as other
phenomena related to changes in matter resulting from
kinetic energy and energy transfer (Abd-El-Khalick et al.
2001). Laws, in contrast, are described by Lederman et al.
(2002) as “descriptive statements of relationships among
observable phenomena” (p. 500). Therefore, it is impor-
tant to note that theories and laws are different types of
knowledge and that theories do not become laws over time
(Abd-El-Khalick et al. 2001). In summary, scientific
theories offer strong evidence for explanations of phe-
nomena never directly observed; theories are tentative and
undergo elaboration and modification with new under-
standing of science (Wong and Hodson 2009).
Social and Cultural Embeddedness Science is a human
effort; and, as such, it is influenced by the context of social
and cultural views of scientists and the culture in which the
research is conducted (Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman
2000; Lederman 1992; Lederman et al. 2002). Lederman
et al. (2002) defined naïve views of the cultural influence
upon the nature of science as the belief that science could
not be influenced by culture or society and the more
informed view as an understanding of the influence of
societal and cultural factors upon the acceptance of
scientific ideas.
Tentative Nature of Science Science is different from
other ways of knowing because science relies upon
observations of the natural world, demands supporting
evidence, and encourages skepticism. Scientific know-
ledge, even though durable, is also tentative and subject
to change within the context of new technologies and
interpretations (Lederman et al. 2002). Popper (1963)
posited that scientific hypotheses, theories, and laws can
never be absolutely proven, regardless of the existence of
supporting empirical evidence. Kuhn (1962) describes
scientific revolutions as occurring when existing theories
are no longer perceived to be satisfactory explanations and
this dissatisfaction with existing theory drives scientific
thinking and research, ultimately resulting in the forma-
tion of new theories. Wong and Hodson (2009) found that
scientists subscribed to the belief that both theories and
laws are subject to change as new knowledge of the
phenomena is gained with the introduction and application
of new technologies. Hence, scientific knowledge is far
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from absolute and will continually to be modified and
elaborated upon as new understandings of phenomena are
realized.
Research Purpose
The overarching purpose of this research was to investigate
the relationship between college students’ epistemological
beliefs and their views on the nature of science. We also
explored for the first time the relationships among
epistemological beliefs, NOS, and conceptual change while
learning about evolutionary theory. The questions that
guided this study were:
& What are, if any, the relationships between epistemo-
logical beliefs and nature of science?
& What are, if any, the relationships between epistemo-
logical beliefs and conceptual change in evolutionary
theory?
& What are the relationships between nature of science
and conceptual change in the evolutionary theory?
Method
Participants
The research was conducted in an introduction to biological
anthropology course throughout the consecutive semesters
between 2006 and 2007 in a Midwestern university. The
sophomore-level course fulfills the biological sciences
general education requirement at the university, and most
of the students enrolled are non-science majors. Further-
more, most of the study participants graduated from in-state
high schools in which teaching evolution theory explicitly
was not strongly encouraged. A total of 133 students
participated in the study with 57 and 76 students in each
semester participating in the study, respectively. Of the
participants, 51.1% were female, 54.9% were either fresh-
men or sophomore, 75.2% of students were between 18 and
21 years old, and 60.2% of the students had not taken a
college-level biology courses before taking this course.
Measurements
Three measurements were used for this research: Episte-
mological Beliefs Inventory (EBI) (Schraw et al. 1995),
NOS, and Understanding Evolutionary Theory Survey.
Epistemological Belief Inventory EBI consists of 32 items
and explains five dimensions of beliefs about knowledge
and knowing: simple knowledge, certain knowledge,
omniscient authority, quick learning, and fixed ability
(Schraw et al. 1995). Among 32 items, simple knowledge
beliefs were measured with seven items (e.g., “Too many
theories just complicate things,” or “The best ideas are
often the most simple.”) Certain knowledge beliefs were
measured with eight items (e.g., “Truth means different
things to different people,” or “If two people are arguing
about something, at least one of them must be wrong.”)
Omniscient authority beliefs were measured with five items
(e.g., “People should always obey the law,” or “People who
question authority are troublemakers.”) Quick learning
beliefs were measured with five items (e.g., “Students
who learn things quickly are the most successful,” or
“Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of
time.”) Fixed ability beliefs were measured with seven
items (e.g., “Some people will never be smart no matter
how hard they work,” or “How well you do in school
depends on how smart you are.”)
A five-point Likert scale was used where 1 indicates
“not at all true of me” and 5 indicates “very much true of
me.” Cronbach alpha was used to check reliability of EBI
dimensions. With our samples, Cronbach alphas range from
0.42 to 0.65 where alpha values of simple knowledge,
certain knowledge, omniscient authority, quick learning,
and fixed ability are 0.63, 0.51, 0.65, 0.42, and 0.68,
respectively.
Nature of Science There are quite number of published
quantitative instruments to measure students’ beliefs
about NOS (Lederman et al. 1998). Perhaps one of the
most widely used instruments to measure NOS is
Lederman and his colleague’s Views of Nature of Science
Questionnaire (VNOS; Lederman et al. 1998, 2002).
VNOS has several evolved forms and the final form is
VNOS-Form C. The final version of VNOS-Form C
consists of ten open-ended questions, and each question
is printed on a single page. According to Lederman et al.’s
recommendation of using VNOS-Form C, administrators
are encouraged not to set time limits when the question-
naire is administered in a classroom. In addition, after the
participation in the open-ended VNOS-Form C questions,
a reasonable portion of correspondents (15–20%) should
be individually interviewed. Then, multiple researchers
analyze both open-ended questions and interview data to
establish interrater reliability for generated individuals’
profiles of NOS. Although the VNOS proved its reliability
and validity (Lederman et al. 2002), it has limitations for
quantifying individuals’ NOS profiles as well as for
administering in a large classroom, especially, in this
case, in a required general course for non-major students.
Therefore, we decided to use existing measurements that
align with our literature review as well as reflecting
educators’ perspectives on NOS.
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Through an extensive search, we found two surveys
that meet our criteria. The two surveys include the 17-
item NOS survey used for American pre-service teachers
in the College of Biology program based at Oregon State
University. The survey can be viewed at the following web
address: http://www.science.oregonstate.edu/bi10x/bi102/
portfolios/natureofsciencesurveyblank.doc. A second, 25-
item NOS survey was developed by Indiana State Univer-
sity’s Evolution and the Nature of Science Institutes for
American high school teachers to use in their classrooms and
can be viewed at the following web address: http://www.
indiana.edu/~ensiweb/lessons/sci.tst.html. Items in the two
surveys were mainly used to create an item pool for
NOS (n=29; see Appendix A). Items in the both surveys
were modified to correspond to our NOS literature. For
this study, a 7-point Likert scale was used where 1
indicates “not at all true of me” and 7 indicates “very
much true of me.”
An Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted to
identify the latent variables of the new instrument with
our participants in the study. The principle component
analysis yielded 11 factors that explained 63.40% of the
total sample variation. Promax rotation was used because
underlying factors are related to some degree. After
applying a cutoff value of 0.40, three factors were
retained that explain a total 29.96% of the variance.
The three factors account for 15.85%, 7.38%, and 6.74%
of the variance, respectively. Table 1 shows the three
factors characterized as: (a) empirical nature of scientific
knowledge, (b) tentative nature of scientific knowledge,
and (c) sociocultural nature of scientific knowledge, with
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha respectively of 0.69, 0.59,
and 0.47.
Understanding Evolutionary Theory Survey The authors
of this study developed the Understanding Evolutionary
Theory Survey for this study using previous conceptual
change studies (Bishop and Anderson 1990; Greene
1990; Wescott and Cunningham 2005). The survey
consists of 34 items, including 13 questions about
natural selection, eight questions about adaptation, seven
questions about general evolution theory, and six
questions about mutation, variation, and inheritance.
Students’ answers were recorded with two options: true
or false.
Research Procedures
The research was conducted ethically following the proto-
cols approved by campus Institutional Review Board. At
the beginning of the semester, the researchers visited the
class and administered Epistemological Belief Inventory
and Nature of Science survey. The Understanding Evolu-
tionary Theory Survey was administered both at the
beginning and at the end of the semester. The surveys were
pen- and pencil-based, and students’ participation in the
research was voluntary.
Table 1 Factor structures of nature of science
Items Factor loadings
F1 F2 F3
10. Scientific explanations are based on empirical observations or experiments 0.69 0.02 −0.00
2. Because science is based upon empirical evidence it is both testable and refutable 0.64 −0.01 −0.06
26. Science is different from other ways of knowing because science requires evidence, emphasizes the use of
empirical standards, logical arguments, and skepticism
0.56 −0.21 −0.11
7. After scientists have developed a theory, the theory may change if new evidence is discovered to be valid 0.50 0.23 −0.08
9. Scientific theories change with new ways of looking at old evidence 0.44 0.04 0.24
28. Science is a process of discovering and revealing things that we cannot see with our eyes 0.41 −0.11 0.12
15. Scientists work together in the formulation of new scientific knowledge and rarely disagree about their ideas and
explanations
−0.07 0.77 −0.05
18. Something that has been researched extensively and “proven scientifically” is no longer subject to change 0.11 0.59 0.05
21. Acceptance of new scientific knowledge is straightforward and involves minimal controversy −0.13 0.40 −0.01
14. Scientific research can be influenced by the race, gender, nationality, or religion of the scientist −0.04 0.04 0.66
22. Scientists must utilize creativity and art in the development of new theories about the natural world 0.02 −0.07 0.50
Unique factor loadings >0.40 are in bold. Analysis is based on 133 observations. Item scores range from ‘not at all true of me’ (1) to ‘very much
true of me’ (7). Internal consistency estimates for factors 1, 2, and 3 are 0.69, 0.59, and 0.47, respectively
Factor 1 empirical nature of scientific knowledge, factor 2 tentative nature of scientific knowledge, and factor 3 social cultural nature of scientific
knowledge
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Results
Relationships Between Epistemological Beliefs and Nature
of Science
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for epistemo-
logical beliefs and nature of science.
In order to find the relationships between EBI and NOS, a
Pearson r correlation was conducted (see Table 3). The
results show moderate and significant relationships between
epistemological beliefs and nature of science. First, simple
knowledge beliefs negatively correlated with tentative NOS,
r (131)=−0.34, p<0.01. This means the more students
believe knowledge is simple, the less they are likely to
believe the tentative nature of scientific knowledge. Second,
certain knowledge beliefs negatively correlated with both
tentative (r (131)=−0.34) and sociocultural nature of
scientific knowledge (r (131)=−0.32). This means the more
students believe knowledge is certain, the less they are likely
to believe tentative and sociocultural nature of scientific
knowledge. Third, quick learning is negatively associated with
both empirical (r (131)=−0.19) and tentative nature of
scientific knowledge (r (131)=−0.36). This implies that the
more students believe learning is quick, the less they are
likely to believe both empirical and tentative nature of
scientific knowledge. Fourth, fixed ability is negatively
associated with tentative nature of scientific knowledge
(r (131)=−0.22). This shows that the more students believe
ability is fixed, the less they are likely to believe that
scientific knowledge is tentative and may change with new
findings, perceptions, or technologies. Last, omniscient
authority is negatively related with both tentative (r (131)=
−0.26) and sociocultural nature of scientific knowledge
(r (131)=−0.19). This means the more students believe
knowledge comes from authority (out of self) such as teacher,
the less they are likely to believe in the tentative and
sociocultural nature of scientific knowledge.
Relationships Between Epistemological Beliefs
and Conceptual Change
Among 133 students, 76 students participated in both the
pre- and post-tests of Understanding Evolutionary Theory
Survey. Among 76 students, 61.8% were either freshmen or
sophomores, 61.8% of the students were females, 80.3% of
the students were between 18 and 21 years old, and 63.2%
of the students had not taken a prior biology course. Among
76 students, 44 students’ post-test scores were higher than
the pre-test scores. Therefore, we interpreted that 44
students did change their misconceptions of evolution
theory in some ways after the lessons; however, the degree
of conceptual change (difference between pre-and post-test)
varies from one to 15. The differences between pre- and
post-test results were used as dependent variables explain-
ing conceptual change. Epistemological beliefs and nature
of science were used separately as independent variables.
To investigate the relationships between epistemological
beliefs and conceptual change in evolutionary theory, multiple
regression analysis was conducted (see Table 4). The
combination of five epistemological beliefs significantly
predicted students’ conceptual change (F(5,70)=5.01,
p<0.05) with two variables significantly negatively contrib-
uting to the prediction: fixed ability and omniscient authority.
The beta weights suggested that two epistemological beliefs
almost similarly predict conceptual change on evolution
theory. This means the more students believe ability is fixed
and knowledge comes from authority, the less likely they are
to experience conceptual change. The adjusted R squared
value was 0.22, indicating 22% of the variance in conceptual
change on evolutionary theory was explained by the model.
Relationships Between Nature of Science and Conceptual
Change
Table 5 shows the results of a multiple regression analysis
conducted to investigate the relationships between NOS
and conceptual change regarding evolutionary theory. The
combination of three types of NOS beliefs did not
significantly predict conceptual change (F(3,72)=0.21, p>
0.05). The results show that students’ beliefs about NOS do
not explain conceptual change in evolution theory, at least
with our samples.
Discussion
Our study shows that epistemological beliefs are associated
with nature of science. The results suggest that immature
epistemological beliefs are reflected as immature beliefs of
nature of science or vice versa. In particular, all aspects of
immature epistemological beliefs are negatively correlated
Table 2 Means and standard deviation for epistemological beliefs and
nature of science
M SD
Simple knowledge 3.42 0.85
Certain knowledge 2.62 0.86
Quick learning 2.34 0.64
Fixed ability 3.56 0.90
Omniscient authority 3.59 0.99
Empirical nature 5.64 0.77
Tentative nature 5.97 0.86
Sociocultural nature 4.48 1.42
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with tentative nature of scientific knowledge. This shows
tentative nature of scientific knowledge is a significant aspect
of NOS and is aligned with all aspects of epistemological
beliefs. In addition, certain knowledge and omniscient
authority are negatively associated with sociocultural nature
of scientific knowledge. This means students who believe
knowledge is certain and comes from authority are not likely to
recognize that scientific knowledge is influenced by social and
cultural contexts. In addition, quick learning beliefs are
negatively related with empirical nature of scientific knowl-
edge. This demonstrates that students who believe learning is
quick are less likely to recognize the empirical nature of
scientific knowledge. All in all, the results consistently show
that educators should help students develop both mature
epistemological beliefs and familiarity with NOS because
epistemological beliefs and NOS are interrelated.
The present study further investigated the role of epistemo-
logical beliefs and NOS on students’ conceptual change in a
college biology course. The two sets of multiple regression
results indicated that students’ beliefs about nature of science
did not predict their conceptual change. Instead, students’
beliefs about nature of knowledge and knowing significantly
predicted their conceptual change regarding evolutionary
theory. In particular, two variables (fixed ability and omni-
scient authority) significantly contributed to explaining the
acquisition of scientific knowledge by the students. Thus, with
our samples, the data suggest that students’ beliefs about
knowledge and knowing influence conceptual change more
than beliefs about NOS.
Recently, Clough and Olson (Clough 2007; Clough and
Olson 2008) raised concerns about teaching NOS tenets. For
example, Clough (2007) is concerned that NOS tenets have
become something to know rather than something to
understand. Students in our research might have perceived
that NOS was something to learn or know; therefore,
students responded to the survey items as if they were
responding to questions on a test rather than participating in
a survey. We established this assumption from the fact that
students’ beliefs about NOS is high but beliefs about NOS
did not predict conceptual change, which is different from
the existing body of research (e.g., Sahin 2010; Stathopoulou
and Vosniadou 2007). As Clough et al. suggested, nature of
science is something to understand rather than something to
know. Therefore, the study results suggest important impli-
cations for teaching epistemological beliefs and NOS in a
college biology course.
Implications for Teaching Epistemological Beliefs
and Nature of Science
Clough (2007) argued that posing questions is a valuable way
to help students understand epistemological beliefs and NOS.
Table 3 Intercorrelations for epistemological beliefs and nature of science
SK CK QL FA OA EN TN SC
SK 1
CK 0.42** 1
QL 0.39** 0.24** 1
FA 0.22* 0.09 0.42** 1
OA 0.31** 0.31** 0.09 0.14 1
EN −0.07 −0.10 −0.19* −0.15 0.04 1
TN −0.34** −0.34** −0.36** −0.22* −0.26** 0.16 1
SC −0.09 −0.32** −0.05 0.06 −0.19* 0.09 0.12 1
SK simple knowledge, CK certain knowledge, QL quick learning, FA fixed ability, OA omniscient authority, EN empirical nature of scientific
knowledge, TN tentative nature of scientific knowledge, and SC sociocultural nature of scientific knowledge
**p<0.01, *p<0.05
Table 4 Regression analysis for epistemological beliefs predicting conceptual change regarding evolutionary theory (N=76)
Variable B SE B β t R2 Adj R2 F (5,70)
1. Certain knowledge 1.13 0.64 0.22 1.77 0.28 0.22 5.01*
2. Simple knowledge −0.79 0.55 −0.18 −1.43
3. Quick learning −1.33 0.81 −0.21 −1.64
2. Fixed ability −1.12 0.48 −0.28 −2.34*
3. Omniscient authority −0.98 0.45 −0.25 −2.16*
*p<0.05
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Viney (2007) posited interactive lessons that emphasize both
epistemological beliefs and NOS for students may be useful
in challenging students’ misconceptions about epistemologi-
cal beliefs and NOS. The two researchers’ suggestions
commonly emphasized students’ active participation in
scientific research.
We believe two important instructional strategies for
engaging students in critical thinking and problem solving
are the case study and problem-based learning (PBL)
instructional strategies (Herried 2007; Hmelo-Silver 2004).
These approaches are effective ways to actively engage
students in learning as well as to improve students’
epistemological beliefs and understanding of the nature of
science (Conley et al. 2004; Herried 2007; Hmelo-Silver
2004; Sahin 2010). When challenged with problems embed-
ded in case studies or problem scenarios, students experience
the scientific process, including posing questions, developing
hypotheses, designing investigations, gathering data, analyz-
ing and interpreting data, drawing conclusions, and support-
ing claims with evidence (Conley et al. 2004; Herried 2007;
Hmelo-Silver 2004; Sahin 2010). Experiencing the scientific
process will promote students’ understanding of epistemo-
logical beliefs and beliefs about NOS. For example, Conley
et al. (2004) used hands-on and inquiry-oriented science
instruction over nine weeks and found young students (fifth
grade elementary school students) developed more sophisti-
cated epistemological beliefs when pre- and post-test of
epistemological beliefs were compared. The results imply that
the case study and PBL approaches that use real data and
situations have the potential to improve college students’
epistemological beliefs and knowledge of NOS as well.
Implications for Teaching Evolution Theory
Evolution theory is a difficult concept to teach in a biology
class because teachers fearing confrontation with students
often avoid controversial concepts such as evolution
(Nickels et al. 1996). Collegiate classes often treat
evolution as a topic amid a plethora of topics taught
throughout the semester rather than a unifying theme
throughout the course (Farber 2003). Furthermore, entry-
level biology classes are typically very large and likely to
consist of well over 100 students, making the implementa-
tion of case study or PBL instructional strategies difficult
for instructors. Farber (2003) suggests implementing a
historical case study approach, similar to a PBL approach,
to engage students with an investigation focused on natural
selection and evolution theory. The case study approach
engages students in gathering evidence, assessing the
credibility of evidence, formulating evidence-based expla-
nations, and testing explanations against current scientific
knowledge (Herried 2007; NAS 1998). Hence, scientific
knowledge emerges from the intersection of human
intelligence with data gathered through observation and
experimentation; evolution is an example of this type of
knowledge as well as an organizational theme in biology
(NAS 1998).
Appendix A
Nature of Science Items
1. Scientific concepts and discoveries can stimulate new
questions and sometimes new problems.
2. Because science is based upon empirical evidence it is
both testable and refutable.
3. Different scientists may arrive at different solutions
resulting from research investigations focused upon
the same problem.
4. Science is mostly concerned with collecting facts
about the natural world.
5. Scientific solutions cannot be based merely upon
personal opinion, belief, or judgment.
6. Human imagination cannot be involved in the creation
of new scientific knowledge.
7. After scientists have developed a theory, the theory
may change if new evidence is discovered to be valid.
8. Disagreement between scientists is considered to be
one of the weaknesses of science.
9. Scientific theories change with new ways of looking
at old evidence.
10. Scientific explanations are based on empirical obser-
vations or experiments.
11. Scientists always provide tentative answers to questions.
12. Because scientific knowledge has been developed
through empirically based research it is considered to
be a highly reliable form of knowledge.
13. A scientific theory is not supported by as much
scientific evidence as a law of science.
14. Scientific research can be influenced by the race,
gender, nationality, or religion of the scientist.
Variable B SE B β t R2 Adj R2 F (3, 72)
1. Empirical nature 0.77 0.59 0.16 1.30 0.06 0.02 0.21
2. Tentative nature 0.41 0.56 0.09 0.72
3. Social cultural nature 0.29 0.30 0.12 0.98
Table 5 Regression analysis for
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15. Scientists work together in the formulation of new
scientific knowledge and rarely disagree about their
ideas and explanations.
16. Requiring evidence to support claims is important in
science and in everyday life as well.
17. Science is never truth or facts because truth or facts
can mean different things to different people.
18. Something that has been researched extensively and
“proven scientifically” is no longer subject to
change.
19. Scientists often try to disprove their own ideas.
20. Scientific explanations must be essentially disprovable.
21. Acceptance of new scientific knowledge is straight-
forward and involves minimal controversy.
22. Scientists must utilize creativity and art in the
development of new theories about the natural world.
23. If a theory is continually tested and determined to be
valid, it will become a law.
24. Theories are immature or unproven laws.
25. Scientists can be biased about what they want to
believe rather than by what observations they make
during their research.
26. Science is different from other ways of knowing and
from other bodies of knowledge because science
requires evidence, emphasizes the use of empirical
standards, logical arguments, and skepticism.
27. Science is a means of identifying and collecting facts
to enhance understanding about the natural world.
28. Science is a process of discovering and revealing
things that we cannot see with our eyes.
29. Skepticism is important for scientists and for the
general public.
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